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FROM CONFLICT PROTRACTION TO PEACE ACTUALIZATION
IN PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Saliba Sarsar

Abstract

This article makes the case for harmonizing top-down peacemaking and bottom-up
peace building in order to create and sustain a culture ~f peace. The analysis,
focused on Palestinian-Israeli relations, finds the answer in the convergence ~f
middle-line peacemakers and peace builders in "a center of peace actualization. "
Such a safe space would allow for a shared concept of history, moderate action, and
collaborative work on behalf of coexistence and social justice. Implied is the need
for peacemakers and peace builders to become involved in each other's domain and
for all concerned to support middle-line peacemakers and peace builders as they
advance peace. Such a concern is especially important and pertinent in our post9111 world as the problems associated with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict persist
and as the search for new ways for building a lasting peace in the Middle East
continues.
Introduction
The struggle between the Palestinians and Israel has resulted in "a war
without end" (La Guardia, 2003) and a "missing peace" (Ross, 2004). It is also
viewed as poisoning Western relations in the world. As La Guardia (2003, p. 400)
writes:
As the September 11 terrorist attacks in America show, the Middle
East is not just a distant place that can be safely left to its own
devices. Anybody with a grudge against America, against the
West, or against pro-western regimes can seize the issue of
Palestine to rally enraged supporters. To resolve the agony of
Palestine would be a major victory of the "war against terrorism.
Among the reasons that prolong the Palestinian-Israeli struggle is the
inability of the contending parties to learn from the past, particularly harmonizing
peacemaking with peace building. These are both necessary for the successful
resolution of protracted conflicts and the creation of a genuine and sustainable
culture of peace. The former, mainly occurring top down, and the latter, mainly
occurring bottom up, have historically operated in separate spheres.
The assumption of and need for synergy or even integration between
peacemaking and peace building are based on research indicating that peacemaking
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does not necessarily translate into peace building and that when the ink on a peace
agreement has dried, real peace will not automatically ensue. Evidence pertains to
South Africa (Hamber 1998), Northern Ireland (Arthur, 1999), and PalestinianIsraeli relations (Kelman 1998, 1999). Moreover, the populations on both sides of
the protracted conflict must engage in psychological and social transformation so
that peace agreements can be successfully implemented. (Bar-On 1997; Bar-Tal
2000). Otherwise, unfulfilled expectations and a de-legitimatization of the peace
process will occur, often producing worse conditions.
There have been multiple attempts and scenarios to resolve the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, but the road has been rocky at best. While some believe there is a
move away from exclusivist toward more accommodationist policies, the
Palestinians and Israelis continue to hold varying definitions of peace, informed
largely by the power asymmetry between them (Sharoni and Abu-Nimer 2000, p.
195) and made more complicated by competing local, regional, and international
interests. If the Palestinians (and other Arabs) and Israel are to accommodate each
other, they must do so from a common understanding of peace, and not only at the
formal governmental levels, but also in informal non-governmental contexts. If
extremists and radicals and if divergent opinions and contradictions within each
national community have stood in the way of peace, the lack of harmonization
between peacemakers at the highest levels and peace builders at the grassroots
levels can also explain the lack of peace progress. Hence, peacemaking and peace
building must be orchestrated, preferably in a safe domain of peace actualization.
In this article, I advocate for the creation of peace beyond brokering a
ceasefire and implementing negotiated peace agreements. I present a way to join
both peacemaking and peace building in order to advance and sustain peace. My
analysis, situated within Palestinian-Israeli relations, is conducted by first making
theoretical distinctions between peacemakers and peace builders and their
respective divisions. Second, the need to develop what I term "peace actualizers" or
"peace actualization," essential for creating a genuine and sustainable culture of
peace, is explored. Policy implications for resolving the protracted PalestinianIsraeli conflict conclude the article.

I. Peacemakers versus Peace Builders
A starting point is to distinguish between peacemakers and ·peace builders
(Galtung 1996, p. 271; Maoz 2004, pp. 564-565). It is also to determine the extent
to which each group embodies hard-line or soft-line traits, or a combination thereof.
While both peacemakers and peace builders work essentially within the
same general milieu, each group follows a different set of values and modus
operandi, based on interest and ideological predilections, policy parameters or
principles, power positions, locus of activities, and reservoirs of resources. These
differences result not only in a natural dichotomy, but also an unnatural lack of
balance and synergy between them.
Peacemakers include government decision-makers and their staffs, usually
military experts, economists, and strategic planners. Peace builders have among
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their ranks heads and members of non-governmental organizations (for example,
research, human rights, and activist) like academicians, artists, doctors,
environmentalists, health professionals, and journalists.
Both groups are
interrelated and can either extend or withhold support from each other. While
acknowledging that peacemakers can draw on direct instruments of power and
coercion, peace builders can appeal to the hearts and minds of members through
vision, a system of common beliefs, and actions.
Peacemakers focus mostly on conflict and initial stages of post-conflict
periods and engage in diplomacy and summitry, sometimes with the involvement of
a third party or go-betweeners (Fisher 1983; McDonald and Bendahmane 1987).
While the ultimate goal is to end a given crisis or conflict, the near-term objective is
to improve communication, change perceptions, and rehumanize the image of the
enemy (Burton, 1969; Rothman, 1992). However, in navigating the process of
settlement and developing trust and understanding, their work remains insufficiently
concerned with "the deeper structural, cultural, and long-term relational aspects of
conflict" (Lederach 1995, p. 201). Peace builders' attention spans the conflictpeace cycles and their actions are directed toward peace promotion. Peacemakers
mainly work to manage or terminate existing hostilities in order to create military
stability and political normalcy, essential for economic viability, social cohesion,
and stable foreign relations. They have a national audience but, simultaneously, are
beholden to their supporters or voters. They are overly and overtly concerned about
short-term policies and outcomes. Peace builders go beyond the obvious, not only
to accomplish most of the above, but also to solve existing and prevent potential
conflicts. They are issue-oriented; build bridges and networks; and emphasize
dialogue and peace, joint community initiatives, socioeconomic development, and
integrated education (Lederach 1997). Connected to specific communities, their
determination is to intentionally address long-term relationships and processes.
Their ultimate goal is to bring about social justice.
The way peacemakers, in their multiple divisions, manage conflict is akin to
what Fisher and Ury convincingly argue in Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In (1981). People see two ways to negotiate: hard or soft. Hard
negotiators view life as a contest of wills in which the winner is the one who holds
strong positions and is able to outlast his opponents. Wanting to avoid personal
conflict, soft negotiators readily concede in order to reach agreement. Yet they
usually feel exploited and bitter. The middle-liners combine both the hard and soft
strategies and negotiate from a principled approach. As Fisher and Ury (1981, p.
xviii) write:
It is to decide issues on their merits rather than through a haggling
process focused on what each side says it will and won't do. It
suggests that you look for mutual gains whenever possible, and that
where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be
based on some fair standards independent of the will of either
side .... It enables you to be fair while protecting you against those
who would take advantage of your fairness.
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While peacemakers and peace builders differ, each group embodies basic
divisions within itself as well, emanating principally from psychological traits and
policy preferences. In this regard, important questions include: In whose interest
are peacemakers and peace builders acting? How do their divisions extend or end
conflict protraction? How do they accommodate their opponents or enemies? What
approaches do they follow to achieve their goals? What is their ultimate goal for
peace?

II. A. Peacemakers: Hard-liners, Soft-liners, and Middle-liners
Critical national decisions are normally made by a handful of key political
and military leaders, usually in consultation with their advisors and important
constituencies. Peace builders influence such decisions to the extent they speak for
powerful forces in civil society and have access to the decision-making process.
While internal, regional, and global affairs impact each decision, it is the leader's or
the peacemaker's personal traits and preferences that ultimately determine the
structure, process, and content of the decision. Personal traits and manifest political
behaviors are closely interrelated. Those predisposed toward conciliation are more
inclined to resolve conflict than others who embody aggressive tendencies.
Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp. 297-310) distinguished between what they
term "hard-liners" and soft-liners" in terms of psychological traits. Leaders they
call hard-liners display limited empathy toward their counterparts in adversary
nations. In the hard liners' view, adversary leaders will submit as a consequence of
firmness, not coercion. Moreover, they view conciliation as a weakness and press
for further concessions rather than accept concessions as accommodation efforts
made in good faith. Hard-liners' limited empathy makes them perceive nations as
being engaged in a virtually unlimited Hobbesian pursuit of power (Table A).
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PEACE BUILDERS

TableA

• Sensitive both to the security dilemma and
to power and resolve factors
• Suspicious about opponent's aggressive
tendencies but sees legitimacy in his
demands
• Move cautiously toward detente but
without yielding any vital interests
• Recognize existence of unavoidable conflict
but willing to define self-interest in minimal
terms in order to minimize conflict

• Empathize with adversary nations and
stress the adversaries' cost in backing down
• Willing to decouple consequences of
immediate conflict from potential conflicts
• Coercion answered by coercion but
conciliatory gestures generate mutual efforts
to compromise
• Conflicts exist among nations but might be
exaggerated by mutual misperception.

PEACE ACTUALIZERS

• Proactive to influence public agenda
in both states for benefit of own people
or cause
• Hold partisan perceptions of peace
and peace building and mobilize
constituencies accordingly
• Equality, parity, and symmetry sought
to serve own interests
Prefer retributive over distributive
justice

•

• Influence public agenda for peace on
both sides of divide for the common
benefit of both peoples
• Firm in demanding distributive justice
and its equitable application on both
sides
• Promote and uphold independence
from parochial or political interests of
either side
• Emphasize shared interests and insist
on equality, parity, and symmetry to
sustain benefits
• Work but not purposefully to
influence the public agenda for peace on
both sides of divide
• Interested in peace building initiatives
but wish these would eventually further
mutual benefit
• Equality, parity, and symmetry
between them and opponents are not
prerequisite
• Prefer distributive to retributive
justice

• Combine positional and transformational leadership qualities
• Embody vision and strategy for peace
• Embrace shared concept of history, moderate action, and collaborative work
• Advance a "conflict partnership approach," based on realistic principles of behavior and
communication
• Shun and go beyond violence to end dehumanization and oppression
• Initiate and sustain education for coexistence and peace
• Proactive in reforming administrative, educational, economic, financial, and/or legal
infrastructures in support of empowerment and democracy
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 12, Number 2
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By contrast, soft-liners empathize more with adversary nations and stress
the adversaries' cost in backing down. Generally, they are willing to decouple the
consequence of the immediate conflict from potential conflicts. For them, coercion
will be answered by coercion but conciliatory gestures will generate mutual efforts
to compromise. Although they acknowledge that conflicts exist among nations,
soft-liners fear that such conflicts might be exaggerated by mutual misperception.
Not all leaders can be neatly placed in a hard- or soft-line mold. Decisionmaking style or strategy preference is not dichotomous; instead, it forms a
continuum along which moderates or middle-liners may also operate. Snyder and
Diesing (1977, p. 309) characterize a middle-liner as one who is:
sensitive both to the security dilemma and to power and resolve
factors ... has some suspicions about the opponent's aggressive
tendencies but also sees some legitimacy in his demands; is willing
to move cautiously toward detente but without yielding any vital
interests in the process; recognizes the existence of unavoidable
conflict but is willing to define self-interest in minimal terms so
that conflict can be minimized.
Moreover, given certain conditions, leaders sometimes modify their traits
and show a willingness to shift their orientations. Some leaders who are aggressive
may acquiesce because of failure in a conflict situation, while others who are
accommodating will escalate the conflict either to placate their constituency or to
give the impression of steadfastness. Hard-liners can become middle-liners, as
illustrated by President Charles de Gaulle's change of policy toward Algeria in 1962
and President Richard M. Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Soft-liners can become
middle-liners, as illustrated by India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his
relationship with China in 1962 and President Bill Clinton in his relationship with
Iraq, especially after the American Embassy bombings. However, leaders rarely
assume opposite orientations to what they truly are. Few soft-liners become hardliners (for example, King Hussein's behavior toward the Palestinians in Jordan in
1970-71 and President Jimmy Carter's policy toward the Soviet Union following its
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979). Fewer hard-liners become soft-liners (for
example, President Anwar Sadat's shift of policy toward Israel, especially his visit
to Jerusalem in November 1977 and President Ronald Reagan's policy toward the
Soviet Union in the late 1980s). However, middle-liners can occasionally shift
toward hard-line or soft-line positions, as illustrated, respectively, by President John
F. Kennedy in his stand toward Cuba and the Soviet Union during the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962 and in his Soviet policy after the crisis.

l

National leaders on both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide are
substantially to blame for conflict protraction. It is actually problematic to call
some of them peacemakers. They speak of peace but few practice it or are serious
about it. These leaders, with the overwhelming majority being males, have
historically made decisions based on narrow self- or party interests, zero-sum
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games, or a "we versus them" mentality. Once their decisions are carried out, more
often than not, the process has taken on a life of its own, diminishing national
community goals and neglecting peace-building approaches. Peacemakers have
constantly misperceived or actually ignored the other's goals and interests, both
during and after conflict. In emphasizing security or violence, they have failed to
realize that such strategies endanger others through insecurity and counter-violence,
fueling passions that lead to communal guilt, collective punishment, and revenge
rather than due process. The general population has either become proponents of
the party line or has dutifully followed, often out of fear, psychological numbing, or
national acculturation. Some have chosen to immigrate or go into self-imposed
exile. Those able have joined the peace builders' camps, preferring to engage in the
public peace process or in addressing community-based and functional issues.
Their motivation is to hasten peace and to set a solid foundation for peace once a
peace treaty is signed.
Serious peacemaking initiatives in Arab-Israeli history (of which the
Question of Palestine has always been central) and Palestinian-Israeli relations have
been few and have occurred at the highest levels. Successes have come when those
involved have been willing to move from a hard-line toward a -soft-line mindset or
from a hard-line or a soft-line toward the middle. Prime examples include Anwar
Sadat's rapprochement with Israel between 1977 and 1981, the Oslo Peace Accords
of September 1993, and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of October 1994. Failure
has occurred when leaders have been reluctant to seize the historic moment and
compromise, such as during the Camp David Summit of July 2000.
More specifically, Sadat-a hard-liner as a subordinate to President Gamal
Abdel Nasser and as Egypt's president and main architect of the October 1973
War-became a middle-liner after 1974. He signed two disengagement agreements
with Israel in January 1974 and September 1975, respectively, reopened the Suez
Canal in June 1975, and proceeded on a path of peace with Israel. He visited
Jerusalem in November 1977, agreed on a framework for peace with Israel's
Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978, and signed the IsraeliEgyptian Peace Treaty in March 1979, which ultimately caused his assassination in
October 1981. Although Sadat considered past history and internal and external
conditions-Egypt's economic difficulties, the failure of Arabism, and prospects of
accommodation with the West, particularly the United States-his final decisions
were based on his judgment. Even if consultative bodies were included at times,
they were not in most cases aware of the facts. According to Heikal, "their
discussions [were] thus ineffectual, perfunctory affairs that affect the decisionmaking process not at all (1978, p. 715).
Similarly, Begin definitely possessed hard-line credentials. An ultranationalist, he commanded the Irgun militia and established Herut in the 1940s. He
was steadfast against improving relations with Germany in the early 1950, and was
even called "a fascist" by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Guridn. Negotiations
with the Arabs were anathema to him, and he captured the elections in May 1977 by
vowing never to return one inch of historic Israel to the Arabs. Yet, when the
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opportunity presented itself, he seized it and welcomed Sadat to Israel. Unlike
Sadat, however, Begin had greater constraints on his decision-making process. He
had to deal with some opposition within his own Likud Party, his coalition partners
in government, and Israel's strict security requirements.
In contrast to Sadat and Begin, Jordan's King Hussein was a soft liner. He
remained reluctant to follow Sadat's example and independently and publicly
negotiate with Israel. Doing so would have put him in Sadat's camp, making him
appear disloyal and jeopardizing his political and physical being. He witnessed his
grandfather Abdallah's assassination by Palestinians at the El-Aksa Mosque in
Jerusalem in 1951 and he reluctantly joined an Arab military pact that ended losing
the June 1967 War to Israel. Where he to indulge in pro-Israel declarations and
policies in the 1970s and 1980s-such as affirming Jerusalem as Israel's capital and
the occupied territories' biblically sanctioned ties to Israel-Arabs would have
accused him of losing Jerusalem not only in war but peacefully abandoning it as
well. Not until the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords by Israel and the Palestinians
was he liberated to do so and reach a peace agreement with its leaders in 1994.
Although an authoritarian monarch, he was restrained in his policies by geopolitics
and demographics, specifically Jordan's location between the Arab states and Israel
on one hand and ethnic Palestinians making up around 60 percent of Jordan's
population on the other. His conversion from peacemaking to peace building came
to full expression just a few short months before his death. In a moving, brief
address at the signing ceremony of the Wye River Agreement on October 23, 1998,
he stated:
We quarrel, we agree; we are friendly, we are not friendly. But we
have no right to dictate through irresponsible action or narrowmindedness the future of our children and their children's children.
There has been enough destruction. Enough death. Enough waste.
And it's time that, together, we occupy a place beyond ourselves,
our peoples, that is worthy of them under the sun, the descendants
of the children of Abraham (Laqueur and Rubin, 2001, pp. 534535).
.As for the Oslo Peace Accords, signed at the White House on September
13, 1993, the Palestinian and Israeli leaders at that time represented hard-liners
(e.g., Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat) moving to the middle or soft-liners (for
example, Yossi Beilin and Mahmoud Abbas) who were ahead of their respective
national communities. Under safe diplomatic conditions in Norway, they were able
to compromise and reach agreement. Once home and in the grip of their practical
national politics, their voices for peace fell on deaf ears. Either the movement to the
middle and the soft-liners' stand were not serious or the infrastructure of peace-in
terms of its sustaining power, internal consolidation, and international linkageswas too weak to accommodate their vision and promises. Moreover, on the Israeli
side, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995 and Palestinian
extremism brought forth a hardening of popular attitudes and two hard-line or antiOslo governments under Benyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon and in-between,
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 2

- 76 -

From Conflict Protraction to Peace Actualization in Palestinian-Israeli Relations

soft-line government under Ehud Barak. On the Palestinian side, a large segment of
Palestinians, mainly followers of the Islamic militant groups of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, became more radicalized given their maximal demands for liberating
Palestine, worsening conditions under Israeli occupation, and the lack of the Oslo
peace dividend. In the cacophony of extremism and jingoism in both national
communities, middle-liners faded away.
Historically, Arab and Israeli peacemakers did not base their important
decisions for peace on attitudes and behaviors of peace builders. Arab states
actually do not have grassroots peace movements. (In discussing Arab peace
activism, Mosaad (2002) finds numerous factors that account for "this mysterious
phenomenon." He holds that Arab governments discourage grass-roots initiatives
for democratic political change. They actually determine and control peacemaking
and peace building. The narrative people hear about the Israelis is that all of them
are militant intent on neutralizing the Arab people and expelling them from the land.
Peace is resisted because, at both the social and intellectual levels, it is associated
"with the stigma of globalization and its Western cultural, economic, and political
hegemony." Arab peoples are not hopeful about their political and societal leaders
or the future, especially that those who became peace proponents were themselves
"corrupt politicians, immoral businessmen, and greedy opportunists." What
weakens peace activism in Arab society is the lack of a clear vision for peace and a
real discourse for peace. What weakens it also is the Israeli occupation and
Palestinian extremism. "In short, Israeli tanks are killing a possible Arab peace
camp just as suicide bombers are killing what is still remaining of the Israeli peace
camp.") Demonstrators are usually opposed to peace with Israel, not supporters of
it. Jordan's King Abdullah' s assassination in July 1951 and Sadat's assassination in
October 1981 express Arab extremism and rejection of peace with Israel. In Israel,
the peace movement has a voice but it is split between the centrist Peace Now
organization, aligned with political parties for social democracy and civil rights, and
the several progressive groups that are often considered extreme by most Israelis.
Moreover, the Israeli peace movement is counterbalanced and sometimes
overshadowed by rightist political and religious parties and groups, including Likud,
Shas, and Gush Emunim.
III. A. Peace Builders: Hard-liners versus Soft-liners versus Middle-Liners

Similar to the Snyder and Diesing characterizations, peace builders embody
traits as well. Hard-line peace builders express themselves through proactive work
at the individual and group levels to influence the public agenda in both national
communities or states for the benefit of their own people or cause. They hold
partisan perceptions of peace and peace building, and mobilize their constituencies
accordingly. Equality, parity, and symmetry are sought to serve their own interests
or are undertaken to meet their "own terms." They prefer retributive over
distributive justice or administering punishment for evil deeds over allocating
collective goods (Table A).
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Those who possess soft-line tendencies work at the individual and group
levels but not purposefully to influence the public agenda for peace on both sides of
the divide. They are truly interested in peace building through educational,
environmental, health, and similar initiatives, and wish that such efforts would
eventually lead to further joint action and mutual benefit. Equality, parity, and
symmetry between them and their opponents are not prerequisite. They seek
minimal demands from their opponents or promote the "live and let live" attitude,
believing that compromise and conciliation will lead to peace with justice. They
prefer distributive to retributive justice.
Middle-line peace builders work at the individual and group levels to
influence the public agenda for peace on both sides of the divide and for the
common benefit of both peoples. They are firm in demanding distributive justice
and its equitable application on both sides. Independence from parochial or
political interests of either side is promoted and upheld. Being aware of the
dynamics of influence and power, they emphasize shared interests and insist on
equality, parity, and symmetry between the contending parties in order to sustain
beneficial relations. As Kelman (1999, p. 202) observes:
the less powerful party is especially inclined to be afraid of
domination and exploitation by the more powerful one, to react to
signs of arrogance and paternalism on the other's part, and to be
sensitive to any implications that it is being treated as inferior. The
more powerful party is confronted with the often contradictory
requirement of providing assistance without establishing a pattern
of dominance, dependency, and interference in the affairs of the
other.
More so than hard liners, soft-line and middle-line peace builders work
toward de-escalating transformations (Kriesberg 2003, pp. 190-199). They engage
in conflict transformation in order to construct "a new social environment that
advances a sense of confidence and improves conditions of life" (Jeong 2000, p.
38).
III. B. Palestinian and Israeli Peace Builders
Palestinian and Israeli peace builders work in radically different
environments. While most Palestinians are excluded from public discourse on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there is a strong presence of peace activism and
peace building in Israel. For Palestinians, the Israeli military occupation and
reactions to it pose additional obstacles that are destroying civil society,
infrastructure, and economy (Roy 2001; 2004). In contrast, Israeli Jews enjoy a
democratic structure and process, a healthier civil society, freer mass media, and
protected human rights.
Given the above, an example of a hard-line peace-building group in Israel is
Women in Black, a loose network of women committed to ending the occupation
and to peace with justice. 1 Another group is the Refuseniks who are conscientious
objectors, mainly army reserve officers and soldiers who refuse to serve in the
Pea_ceilld Conflict Studies• Volume 12, Number 2
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Palestinian occupied territories. 2 A third is Yesh Gvul ("There is a limit!"). As its
web site explains, it is "an Israeli peace group campaigning against the occupation
by backing soldiers who refuse duties of a repressive or aggressive nature. The
brutal role of the Israeli army in subjugating the Palestinian population places
numerous servicemen in a grave moral and political dilemma, as they are required
to enforce policies they deem illegal, immoral and ultimately harmful to Israeli
interests." 3 MIFT AH, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global
Dialogue & Democracy, is a fourth group. Founded by Hanan Ashrawi and other
well-known Palestinian personalities in Jerusalem in 1999, it is committed "to
fostering the principles of democracy and effective dialogue based on the free and
candid exchange of information and ideas .. .to ensure democratic practice, the rule
of law and respect for human rights. " 4 A careful look at its activities and
philosophy, however, indicates a strictly pro-Palestinian stand.
Among the soft-line peace-building groups are Beit Adam, a place for
cultural exchange and enrichment, "in the spirit of ecological awareness, sharing,
and nonviolence." 5 A second is Friends of the Earth Middle East. Founded in
1994, it is the · first organization of leading Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli, and
Palestinian environmental NGOs. Its primary objectives are "the protection of our
environmental heritage, the promotion of sustainable development, and the creation
of conditions necessary for a lasting peace."6 A third is Ossim Shalom-Social
Workers for Peace and Social Welfare, a voluntary professional association
established by Arab and Jewish social workers in order to promote peace and social
welfare in Israel and the neighboring states (Adwan and Bar-On 2000, p. 50). A
fourth is the Peres Center for Peace, a non-partisan, non-profit organization founded
in 1997 by Shimon Peres "to contribute to peace in the Middle East by building an
infrastructure that promotes socio-economic development while advancing
cooperation and understanding." 7 A fifth is the Sabeel Center, a Jerusalem-based
institution for "Palestinian liberation theology," which Reverend Nairn Stifan
Ateek, an Anglican minister, founded in 1992. It calls for advancing peace with
justice for both Palestinians and Israelis but works primarily on building the
political and social consciousness of Palestinian Christians. 8
Closer to the middle, coming from the hard-line groups, is "Ta'ayush"
(Arabic for "life in common"), "a grassroots movement of Arabs and Jews, which
was formed in Fall 2002. It works "to break down the walls of racism and
segregation by constructing a true Arab-Jewish partnership. A future of equality,
justice and peace begins today, between us, through concrete, daily actions of
solidarity to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to achieve
full civil equality for all Israeli citizens."9 Closer to the middle, but originating in
the soft-line camp, is Peace Now, Israel's first mass peace movement. Created in
1978 by 348 reserve officers and soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, it has
pressed the Israeli government to seek peace with the Palestinians through
negotiations and mutual compromise. Its belief is that "security, human dignity,
and a promising future can only come through peace." 10 Large and consensusoriented, Peace Now has been reluctant to publicly criticize government policies
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(Svirsky 2001, pp. 323-324). Also closer to the middle is Gush Shalom, a "peacer
than Peace Now" group. Uri Avnery and others founded it in 1993 to influence
Israeli public opinion and lead it toward peace and conciliation with the Palestinian
people. Its aims include: ending the occupation; accepting the Palestinian right to
self-determination and creation of an independent and sovereign state in all the
territories occupied by Israel in 1967; establishing Jerusalem as the capital of the
two states, with East Jerusalem (including the Haram al-Sharif) serving as the
capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem (including the Western Wall) serving as the
· capital of Israel; recognizing in principle the Right of Return of the Palestinian
refugees, while allowing each refugee to choose freely between compensation and
repatriation to Palestine and Israel. .. ; safeguarding the security of both Israel and
Palestine by mutual agreement and guarantees; and striving for overall peace
between Israel and all Arab countries and the creation of a regional union. 11
Middle-line Palestinian-Israeli groups include IPCRI, the Israel/Palestine
Center for Research and Information. A non-governmental, non-profit organization,
directed by Israeli Gershon Baskin and Palestinian Hanna Siniora (and during 19902004 by Palestinian Zakaria al-Qaq), has worked for years to create a culture of
peace. 12 For IPCRI, real peace "can only be made and consolidated by a
transformation on the cultural-ideological level, through people-to-people change of
heart: from trauma, fear, and anger to healing, forgiveness and reciprocal
acceptance" (Gershon & Al-Qaq 1999, p. 3). Among its goals are: starting of a
process of reflection in the Israeli and Palestinian societies to see how peace will
affect the way each side view itself and the other and the mutual relationship, and
fostering among Palestinians and Israelis values and habits of tolerance, listening,
empathy, and an openness to reassess one's own assumptions (Gershon & Al-Qaq
1999, p. 3). Another active middle-line group is PRIME, the Peace Research
Institute in the Middle East, co-directed by Israeli Dan Bar-On and Palestinian Sarni
Adwan. It is a non-governmental, non-profit organization established by Palestinian
and Israeli researchers in 1999 with the main goal of pursuing coexistence and
peace building through joint research and outreach activities.
Its practical
objectives include: building an intellectual infrastructure of peace; influencing the
public agenda in Israel and Palestine; offering ideas and proposals for overcoming
obstacles in .peace building; training a new generation of leaders, committed to
peaceful coexistence and cooperation; and contributing to the strengthening of civil
society. 13 A third middle-line group is MECA, the Middle East Children's
Association, co-directed by Israeli Adina Shapiro and Palestinian Ghassan
Abdullah. With its motto of "Education for Peace, Peace through Education," it
enables teachers from both national communities to work jointly on projects, thus
transforming attitudes and preparing the youth for tomorrow. Also active in the
middle are:
the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva; 14 Neve
Shalom/Wahat al-Salam or Oasis of Peace; 15 One Voice, "a practical initiative to
amplify the voice of moderates and achieve a consensus for conflict resolution
among Palestinians and Israelis at the grass roots level;" 16 and the People's Voice
Initiative. 17 Its co-leaders, Palestinian Sari Nusseibeh and Israeli Ami Ayalon, note:
[The] initiative is not simply a piece of paper or a set of principles.
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It is an instrument of political change. It is based on partnership; on
people, not on individual leaders; and on trust building.... It is an
instrument of hope and clarity: It provides both sides with a vision

of a future in which each side can see its respective concerns met,
thereby encouraging the two people to act together to bring about
change. (Nusseibeh & Ayalon 2004)
Like the aforementioned peacemaking initiatives, the peace building
movements may have promoted joint activities and mutual understanding but their
differing images of reality, power asymmetries, and expectations have kept their
influence limited (Abu-Nimer 1999). Moreover, the focus on the Palestinian side
has been on state-building at the expense of non-governmental organizations (Shain
and Sussman, 1998, pp. 275-306). In addition, Hassassian (2000, p. 29) observed:
"The contribution of Palestinian Third Sector activities to peace-building is minimal
and to date is largely insignificant. Most. .. have a pre-established commitment to
the national struggle that supersedes any commitment to what is commonly referred
to as the peace process." On the Israeli side, the diagnosis is similar. As Newman
(2001) states:
Until now, Israeli peace movements have concentrated on the
pragmatics, rather than the morals, of peace. They have focused on
the means to prevent further violence rather than disseminating the
message of equality and morality ... Even at the height of the peace
process, when things were moving ahead in a slow, but positive,
way, the focus was on the pragmatics and the technicalities, not the
essential morality of ending the Occupation, or of the need to relate
to the national "Other" as an equal.
Those that have succeeded in winning some people's hearts and minds have not
prevented the renewal of violence or ended the conflict's protraction. As Maoz
(2004, p. 563) correctly points out "Israeli-Palestinian peace building activities
clearly have not achieved their goal. Scores of people-to-people projects were
conducted after the signing of the Oslo peace accords in September 1993, but these
projects did not seem to prevent the collapse of the peace process and the reemergence of severe violence between the sides, seven years later, in late September
2000."

For the first four years of the second Palestinian intifada and the resultant
Israeli reaction, it became unwise and even dangerous to promote peace or speak
against violence. Some peace building groups, like the Jerusalem Center for
Women were "discouraged" not to dialogue with its Bat Shalom, its Jewish
counterpart, through the Jerusalem Link, and others even faced harassment from
national and governmental forces. In December 2002, for instance, Sari Nusseibeh
and Ami Ayalon of the People's Voice Initiative, came under harassment from both
the Palestinian and Israeli authorities. This clearly shows that "neither side is
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willing to see an unofficial movement with such potential to grow and prosper."
(Wurfel 2003)
IV. Peace Actualizers for a New Beginning
While the middle-liners in both peacemaking and peace building groups are
often in the minority or "swimming upstream," the hard-liners become entrenched
as the vocal majority and the soft-liners turn voiceless as the silent majority.
Overall, the peacemakers' top-down approach carries some legitimacy but usually
lacks sustenance from below. The peace builders' bottom-up approach embodies
the commitment but lacks the empowerment, the multiple issue orientation, the
financial and organizational stability, and the funding needed for national action,
which is often deficient or dependent on external sources. An integrated
perspective is critical for generating common strategies for peace.
Proposed is a theoretical but practically possible, central, safe space where
both middle-line peacemakers and peace builders can become peace actualizers.
Peace actualizers embody not only the vision and strategy for peace, but also have
direct or indirect positional leadership anchoring and transformational leadership
qualities to make a real difference. They tend to embrace a shared concept of
history, moderate action, and collaborative work with the other to achieve positive
peace. Having such a space alters attitudes and reshapes values toward cont1ict
management and peace, expands positive identifications, enables trust to grow,
reduces domestic constraints on positional leaders and governmental strictures on
citizens, and provides support from a larger peace coalition or movement, thus
guaranteeing legitimacy for peace. It also helps in transforming individuals and
communities, both emotionally and structurally, for social justice. The deeper
people engage in peace actualization, the further they move from the abyss of
dehumanization, victimization, and death and the closer they approach mutual
acceptance, healing, and hope.
While peacemakers and peace builders follow what Burns (1978, p. 4) calls
transactional leadership, one that allows leaders to "approach followers with an eye
to exchanging one thing for another," peace actualizers are transforming leaders. In
a transforming environment, a leader "looks for potential motives in followers,
seeks to justify higher needs, and engages the full person of the follower. Hence,
what transforming leadership engenders is "a relationship of mutual stimulation and
elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral
agents." It produces also what De Pree (1997, p. 22) calls "movements" that enable
"a collective state of mind, a public and common understanding that the future can
be created, not simply experienced or endured."
Peace actualizers resolve conflict by advancing "a conflict partnership
approach," one that is based on realistic principles of human behavior and
communication. The skills necessary to unblock disagreements include how to:
recognize each party's hidden perceptions of the conflict; discover the shared needs
of the relationship; focus on a plan for the future rather than blame for the past; and
agree on doables-actions that can be taken immediately and used as steppingstones to agreement (Weeks 1992, pp. 63-70). Relationships here rise above the
expedient and the pragmatic and move away from a hard or soft base to a principled
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one (Table A).
Voices for peace actualization are loud and clear. In an international
encounter on the Question of Palestine in 1993, participants argued for a culture of
peace,
. . . a comprehensive society-wide system of values, beliefs and
attitudes, the interplay and impact of which in and on the civil
society would lead citizens of the Middle East-Arabs, Israelis,
Palestinians-in their daily lives, on the ground, to put a premium
on peace, to desire peace, to seek peace and to stand for peace. 18
Participants at another international conference ten years later, titled "Building a
Culture of Peace," organized by the Jewish Arab Center for Peace at Givat Haviva,
under the auspices of UNESCO, passed five resolutions. One called upon the
Israeli Government, the Palestinian Authority, and other states to create "Culture of
Peace Commissions" in each country. "These commissions will work in
coordination to encourage non-violence, cooperation, cross-cultural relations,
dialogue as a means of conflict resolution, and humanitarian values." 19
In a new culture of peace, a new peace movement would arise, designed to
meet not only the pragmatic aspects of life but their moral dimensions as well. As
Newman (2001) explains:
A new peace movement must be one which focuses on the sanctity
of human life and the immorality of controlling another nation
while at the same time one which can gain mass support for a
renewal of the peace process and its implementation on the ground.
It must be a movement which expends its energy and resources on
education, on reaching children and young adults, on influencing
them to believe that peace is not simply a pragmatic objective to be
achieved-which it is-but that it is essentially moral and right.
It is here that voices of reason are best heard. It is here that criticism of oneself and
the other becomes possible. Isseroff (2003) urges:

We need to hear everyone's voices in support of peace, and in
support of the public process for peace, in support of ending the
occupation and of ending the violence. No more suicide "martyrs"
and no more "resistance" to peace negotiations, no more reprisals,
and no more repression. We must not dignify murderers and their
supporters as freedom fighters, and we must not excuse property
theft, brutality and repression as "self defense.
A difficult task, obviously, is moving toward peace actualization when so
many lives and interests are entangled in the web of conflict protraction. While
there are no easy answers, the adoption of an idea necessitates "a shift of mind," one
that goes beyond "survival learning" or adaptive learning to emphasize "generative
learning" that enhances the capacity to create (Senge, 1990, pp. 13-14).
Understanding the process of social transformation clarifies "how the impossible
becomes possible" and suggests "how we might best spend our time."20
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A new culture of peace and a new peace movement would shun violence
and end dehumanization and repression. It would initiate and sustain education for
coexistence, and work to transform the administrative, socio-economic, financial,
judicial, legal, and political order to empower people. It would insist on a more
equitable distribution of funds, in support of education for peace and
transformational leadership, health, economic well-being, and the environment. It
would embrace children and empower women and minorities to participate on an
equal footing with the rest of society.
However, if peace actualization is to happen in Palestinian-Israeli relations,
more peacemakers and peace builders must move to the middle and those in the
middle must move to the center of the new peace culture and movement. This
means that more peacemakers must become active in peace building and more
peace builders must engage in peacemaking. Peace actualization will not be
advanced if we continue to wait for peacemakers to become peace builders only
after they leave public office or when they near death. Peace builders distancing
themselves from public office might maintain their independence from politicoideological interests and keep them focused on the peace tasks at hand but will not
further their cause or create a better future. Moreover, it behooves voters to elect
middle-line peacemakers, thus encouraging-and hopefully transforming-hardliners and soft-liners to move to the middle. It also behooves all of us-individuals,
groups, nations, and international order-to support the middle and the center in
order to make peace actualization a reality.
Only then can our deeds and narratives be inclusive and meaningful. Only
then can Palestinian and Israeli children meet each other anew, as equals,
acknowledging their shared vision and mission. Only then can peace with justice
for all be possible. Only then can our voice and sentiments mutually reach out and
place us at the heart of peace!
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Endnote
The Women in Black group started in Israel but currently has a wide international network.
See http://www. womeninb lack.net/.
For a declaration of Israeli reservists who refuse to serve on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, see http://www.spectacle.org/0302/refuse.html.
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See http://www.yesh.gvul.org/English/.

See http://www.miftah.org/.
See http://www.planet.edu/~beitadam.
6 See http://www.foeme.org/.

4

5

See http://www.peres-center.org.
See http://www.sabeel.org/.
9 See http://www.taayush.org.
10 See http://www.peacenow.org.il/.
7

8

See http://www.gush-shalom,org.
See http://www.ipcri.org/.
13 See http://www.webartery.com/PRIME/.
14 See http:!/66.155.17.109/peace/.
15 Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam was founded by Bruno Hussar, a Dominican monk, with
the intention of creating a safe place where Arabs and Jews would live together despite
national and religious differences and would conduct joint educational work for peace. See
the village's web site at http://www.nswas.com/.
16 See http://www.silentnolonger.org/.
17 See http://www.mifkad.org.il.
18 Cited in the Proceedings of the United Nations Department of Public Information's
International Encounter for European Journalists on the Question of Palestine, London, UK,
June 9-11, 1993.
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